Environmental buyouts: protection at a price. by Fields, Scott
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Environews Spheres of InfluenceFor the most part, the environmental community
has welcomed these “white knights” armed with buy-
out dollars. But buyout critics—who span the politi-
cal spectrum from far right to far left—claim that
although buyouts appear on the surface to be an easy
way out, they disrupt the marketplace and offer
incentives for bad behavior.
Swap Meet
Some buyouts are meant to protect the species, land-
forms, or other features of a parcel of land, while oth-
ers are meant to prevent polluting activities, such as
mining or oil exploration, from taking place on the
land. Regardless of the goal of the purchase, the issues
linked to buyouts are essentially the same, says John
Echeverria, executive director of the Georgetown
Environmental Law and Policy Institute at
Georgetown University. 
Buyouts are one of four models of environmental
protection. The other models are regulation, in
which the state makes rules to protect the environ-
ment; free market environmentalism, in which no
governmental activity, whether regulation or buyout,
is allowed; and periodic payments, in which the gov-
ernment, a nonprofit organization, or even a private
party makes regular payments to landholders who in
exchange agree to restrictions on how they use their
property for a limited period of time. The mix
between these strategies varies with the political cli-
mate. Currently in the United States, Echeverria
says, regulation has been at best stagnating in the
mix. In some senses, environmental activists have
been left little choice but to buy to protect. 
An environmental buyout is basically a swap—
money for land, money for mineral rights, land for
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ENVIRONMENTAL BUYOUTS
Environmentalists working with the notion that the dollar can be more power-
ful than the regulatory sword have in the last two decades turned increasingly to
an alternative strategy for preventing some types of potential pollution. Rather
than lobby or regulate to stop such activities as mining of minerals and drilling
for oil, governments, nonprofit groups, and other organizations have started to
buy land—or mineral rights to land—to stop the activities from starting at all.
Protection
Price
at aland, land for mineral rights.
Buying land to protect it or its
contents is nothing new; in the
United States, the concept really
took off in the 1980s. During this
period, public interest in the envi-
ronment germinated hundreds of
small land conservancy organiza-
tions and helped the Nature
Conservancy—which has the mis-
sion of buying land to protect
it—to become the largest envi-
ronmental group in the world. 
In the last two decades, govern-
ments at all levels started informal
buyout programs as well, although
Celia Boddington, a spokesperson
for the U.S. Bureau of Land
Management (BLM), says the
BLM has, to her knowledge, never
had a formal pollution-prevention
buyout program. Instead, any pur-
chases have been generated on an
ad hoc basis by the BLM, Congress,
or high-level administrators such as
former secretary of the interior
Bruce Babbitt, frequently after lob-
bying by environmental groups. 
The last few years have seen a
handful of pollution-prevention buyouts in
the United States. For example, in 2000 the
U.S. Department of the Interior paid $1
million to close the White Vulcan Mine, an
open-pit pumice extraction facility near
Flagstaff, Arizona. In 2002 American
Electric Power engineered a buyout of virtu-
ally the entire town of Cheshire, Ohio, pay-
ing the 200 or so residents $20 million for
their homes and their promise to not sue for
exposure to past pollution from the compa-
ny’s nearby coal-fired power plant. 
Also in 2002, the Bush administration
agreed to spend $235 million to buy back
oil and natural gas rights—which the feder-
al government had sold to Chevron,
Conoco, and the Murphy Exploration and
Production Company in the 1980s—in the
Everglades and in waters near the Florida
Panhandle. This agreement, said President
Bush at a 30 May 2002 news conference,
will protect about 765,000 acres in the
Everglades, Big Cypress National Preserve,
the Florida Panther National Wildlife
Refuge, and Ten Thousand Islands
National Wildlife Refuge from drilling or
spills related to drilling. 
In late 2003, two Native American
tribes—the Chippewa Mole Lake Band and
the Forest County Potawatomi—struck a
deal to pay $16.5 million for the Crandon
Mine site in northeastern Wisconsin. The
tribes acquired a tract of 6,000 acres, mineral
rights to the land, and the mining company
itself. This ended a battle of almost three
decades to prevent the opening of the zinc
and copper mine, which the tribes said
would sully their reservations, wild rice
ponds, and pristine waterways, including the
Wolf River.
Simple or Simplistic?
Although activists have applauded land and
mineral rights acquisitions as a solution that
appears to offer long-term environmental
protection, critics question how well buyouts
really work. “The basic reality is that there is
no way that we can buy our way out of the
larger-scale environmental land management
problems that we have,” says Leigh
Raymond, an assistant professor of political
science at Purdue University who studies
environmental policy. “As seductive as the
option is, it’s just not feasible, financially, to
do that in the grand scheme of things. And
secondly, I’m not sure we should. I think it’s
an open question whether and to what
degree a property owner owns the right to
do certain destructive things with his or her
land.” 
There is also no guarantee, says
Echeverria, that buyouts offer any real
security in the long run. “There’s a com-
pletely erroneous assumption that buyouts
result in permanent protection of the
resources,” he says, “and it’s just not so.”
Conditions that are placed on purchases
can be easy to change, and many of the
organizations that are buying land are small
and not particularly stable. The managers
of these organizations change, and with
them may change the organizations’ philoso-
phies. If the government is buying the land,
the rules governing how that land is treated
can change with a new administration.
Conservative theorists such as Jay Lehr, a
hydrologist and science director of the inde-
pendent Heartland Institute research organi-
zation of Chicago, oppose buyouts—at least
those that governments make—because
they undermine the free operation of the
capitalist system. When governments step
in to purchase land, Lehr says, they affect
the demand for that land and so influence
the price that similar parcels will com-
mand. And when governments use taxpay-
er funds to buy land, they are transferring
wealth from many individuals to a few.
“We need to separate out what is a good
economic decision and will benefit the
greatest good for the greatest number with-
in the nation,” Lehr says, “from what is a
rather underhanded political motivation
that is covered up by fuzzy rhetoric from
the environmental groups.”
Ultimately, says Jim Jensen, executive
director of the Montana Environmental
Information Center, a nonprofit advocacy
group in Helena, the taxpayers bear the costs
when land is bought instead of regulated. If
a government buys, of course, tax dollars are
used. If a nonprofit group is doing the buy-
ing, the land is removed from the tax rolls.
And if land is donated, the donor gets a tax
break. There are also tax breaks for allowing
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Disaster averted? Reclamation work is done on the Glengarry Mine site (above), part of the New World min-
ing area on Henderson Mountain in Montana. The site was purchased to prevent toxic contamination of water-
ways in nearby Yellowstone National Park by acid drainage from hardrock mining.conservation easements or covenants to be
attached to land and for selling below mar-
ket value. This is only fair, says Brook
McDonald, president and CEO of The
Conservation Foundation, a Naperville,
Illinois, nonprofit land and watershed pro-
tection organization—since the public is
calling for environmental protection, the
public should bear at least some of the cost.
Right, But for the Wrong Reasons
Perhaps the best publicized pollution-pre-
vention buyout in U.S. history—and one
that points up some of the imperfections of
the strategy—was the 1996 New World
Mine land exchange. This gold, silver, and
copper mine would have sat high on
Montana’s Henderson Mountain, not far
from Yellowstone National Park. Although
environmentalists worried that the land
itself would be marred by the massive min-
ing operation, their real fear was that highly
acidic runoff from the mine would contam-
inate rivers, including those running
through Yellowstone. A hardrock mine can
produce acid mine drainage until all of its
sulfides are consumed, which can take hun-
dreds of years [for more information on acid
mine drainage, see “The Earth’s Open
Wounds: Abandoned and Orphaned
Mines,” EHP 111:A154–A161 (2003)]. 
Activists also worried that cyanide,
which is used to separate gold flakes from
pulverized ore, could escape into the regional
watershed. Cyanide spills—from collapsed
or leaking structures that are meant to con-
tain mine refuse or from accidents in han-
dling the transportable dry crystal form of
the chemical—have contaminated hundreds
of miles of rivers in such locations as Brazil,
Guyana, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Romania,
Spain, and the United States, in some cases
killing virtually all wildlife nearby. When
cyanide is used to liberate gold from rock, it
also frees other heavy metals, such as arsenic,
mercury, and selenium, which can find their
way into the water supply if containment
structures fail.
The threat of a massive cyanide-depen-
dent hardrock mine perched above
Yellowstone became a cause célèbre. A 14
August 1995 New York Times editorial
called for Congress to buy out—or failing
that, for President Clinton to regulate out—
the proposed mine. The Clinton administra-
tion ultimately paid $65 million to Crown
Butte Mines, a U.S. subsidiary of Canadian
mining giant Noranda, for mining claims on
about 25,000 acres surrounding the New
World site, and the mine was never built.
Like most pollution-prevention buyouts,
the New World deal played well in much of
the environmental community. “There was
nearly universal support for the buyout
when it was announced,” says Jensen. “But
in my estimation, the public was generally
misled by the environmental community.” 
Although the mine should not have been
allowed, Jensen says, the arguments made in
favor of the buyout were overstated. He
explains that the New World site was not
pristine but rather in one of the most pollut-
ed areas in Montana, contaminated with
pollution caused by historic mining there.
And although a full-scale cyanide-based
metal mine could have threatened
Yellowstone, he says, the potential impacts
were exaggerated.
But the primary reason that this deal
didn’t make sense, Jensen says, is that, as
with other pollution-prevention buyouts,
proper regulation could have accomplished
the same goal for far less money. “There
were a number of reasons not to build that
mine,” he says. “Their tailings impound-
ment was engineered in a place and with a
design that was extremely likely to fail and
would have violated the wetlands protection
provisions of the Clean Water Act. There
was perfect authority in federal law to deny
that permit. The Clinton administration
simply wasn’t willing to do it.” 
Raised Expectations
An unfortunate side effect of beginning a
pattern of buyouts is that it stimulates
demand for future buyouts, Raymond says.
When potential sources of pollution draw
high buyout prices that are far above what
similar, but benign, lands would command,
Echeverria adds, a new type of prospecting
is created: searching for land for which just
the threat of development will draw an
attractive payoff. 
“[Habitual buyouts] create the availabili-
ty of public and private funds for buyouts
and encourage investors to scout out those
kinds of opportunities, invest in problematic
projects, and pursue environmentally
destructive ideas in order to put themselves
in the position where they can demand
compensation,” Echeverria says. Called
“environmental extortion” or “environmental
blackmail” by some activists and “fair com-
pensation” by industry, such requests from
landowners and claim holders often follow
close on the heels of a high-profile buyout.
Montana, which houses both unspoiled
wilderness and some of the most polluted
mine sites in the country, is a case in point.
Within a month of the New World deal,
says Jensen, a Canadian speculator went into
one of the region’s most sacred, ecologically
significant areas, a place called the Rocky
Mountain Front, and staked mineral claims.
The claim holder told the press that he
would consider buyout offers from the fed-
eral or state government. 
Similarly, another claim holder in
Montana bought the rights to an 891-acre
site in the Sweet Grass Hills that Jensen says
includes some the most environmentally
sensitive areas in the state and is also sacred
to several Native American tribes. The claim
holder has suggested that Congress approve
funds for the BLM to buy out his holdings
so that the property can be developed as a
state park. Failing that, he suggested that the
state itself make the purchase. In addition to
the value of the land, the landowner has
asked to be compensated for the value of the
gold and silver—which he has estimated at
1.75 million ounces—that he planned to
extract from the land. Such requests are
common but unjustified if the area could
not be mined legally in the first place,
Raymond says. 
There’s no way to know whether a claim
holder is prospecting for minerals or for buy-
outs, says Alan Septoff, research and infor-
mation systems director of Earthworks, a
Washington, D.C., environmental nonprofit
formerly known as the Mineral Policy
Center. Regardless, he says, just the existence
of lucrative buyouts creates an expectation of
similar deals among claim holders.
A Better Bargain?
If buyouts aren’t the right answer, what is?
Governments should regulate rather than
compensate, Septoff says. A good start, he
says, would be to reform the 1872 Mining
Law, which allows individuals to claim cer-
tain federal lands if they can first prove that
they could sustain a profitable hardrock
mine and then come up with $5 an acre,
plus a $100-per-claim annual fee. 
Even without these changes, regula-
tion—old, new, or revised—can be effective,
Jensen says. The Crandon Mine deal in
northern Wisconsin, for example, was bro-
kered in large part because a series of compa-
nies were not able to persuade the state to
issue permits for the mine to open, says Al
Gedicks, executive secretary of the nonprofit
Wisconsin Resources Protection Council.
And in 1998 Montana adopted a citizen’s
initiative known as I-137—which the
Montana Environmental Information
Center proposed and mining companies are
challenging—that prohibits new open-pit
cyanide-based gold mines.
When you regulate effectively, Raymond
says, buyouts become less necessary. “I worry
that in the rush to embrace acquisition as a
really useful strategy for conservation,” he
says, “that we’ll lose sight of the fact that reg-
ulation is far more effective and, in some
ways, far more important as a way of making
sure that people who own land protect it.”
Scott Fields
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